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KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.—AN
EXPANDED APPLICATION OF THE “FIRST SALE
DEFENSE”

by

J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM*

INTRODUCTION
Under U.S. copyright law, a copyright holder possesses the
exclusive right to distribute copyrighted material to the public
for sale or other transfer of ownership. That exclusive right is,
however, subject to a number of statutory exceptions. One
exception is the “first sale” doctrine, which not only cuts off
the copyright holder’s ability to structure the sale and
downstream distribution of copies of that material that were
manufactured in the United States but also allows the owner of
a lawfully acquired copy of that copyrighted material to resell
it without obtaining the permission of the copyright holder. In
the recent case of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
(hereinafter Wiley),1 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to
reconcile a number of statutory provisions in order to
determine whether there was an extraterritorial dimension to
the “first sale” doctrine. This article will examine how the
Court’s decision in Wiley expanded the application of the “first
sale” doctrine to include copyrighted goods that were
__________________
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manufactured abroad rather than limiting it to copyrighted
goods that were manufactured domestically.
THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COPYRIGHT CLAIM IN
THE WILEY CASE
The parties involved in the Wiley case were a foreign
student with an entrepreneurial plan and a major U.S. publisher
of textbooks. In 1997, Supap Kirtsaeng, a native of Thailand,
came to the United States to earn an undergraduate degree in
mathematics at Cornell University. After graduating from
college, Kirtsaeng received a fellowship to continue his
education in the doctoral program in mathematics at the
University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
As an undergraduate, Kirtsaeng discovered two things about
his college textbooks. This first was that they were very
expensive. The second was that the foreign editions of the
same textbooks were a lot cheaper. It was this second
discovery that gave Kirtsaeng the idea to sell copies of the
foreign editions of textbooks to U.S. students for a profit.
Prior to executing his plan, Kirtsaeng consulted with some
friends in Thailand and checked out copyright rules on the
website “Googles Answers.”2 After concluding that his plan
was viable, he asked his family and friends buy the textbooks
in Thailand and ship them to him in California. Kirtsaeng,
doing business as BlueChristine99, then posted the books for
sale at a significantly higher price on commercial websites
such as eBay.com. As he had anticipated, his plan proved to
be a financial success. His earned revenues, prior to
reimbursing his family and friends, were reported to be
somewhere between $900,000 and $1,200,000.3
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Wiley) was the holder
of the copyright for some of the textbooks that Kirtsaeng resold
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on the internet. Wiley published the textbooks targeted for its
domestic market in the United States and John Wiley & Sons
(Asia) Pte Ltd. (hereinafter Wiley Asia), its wholly-owned
subsidiary, published the foreign editions of those same
textbooks abroad.4 In most cases, the contents of the domestic
and foreign books were either similar or identical. The biggest
differences were in the design, the supplemental content (U.S.
versions typically included CD-ROMS), the type and quality of
the materials used in the printing and binding, and the quality
of the graphics.5
It should be noted that inside every book published by both
Wiley and Wiley Asia was the following warning:
No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form or by any means . . . except as
permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976
United States Copyright Act.6
In addition, every textbook contained a specific claim for
copyright protection. A typical copy of an American edition of
a Wiley textbook would read:
Copyright ©2008 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All
rights reserved . . . Printed in the United States
of America.7
The insert in the foreign edition of a comparable Wiley Asia
textbook would read:
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia)
Pte Ltd[.] . . . All rights reserved. This book is
authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and
the Middle East only [and] may not be exported
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out of these territories. Exportation from or
importation of this book to another region
without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal
and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The
publisher may take legal action to enforce its
rights. . . . Printed in Asia.8
When Wiley became aware of Kirtsaeng’s operation, it filed
a lawsuit against him in the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of New York claiming federal copyright 9 and
trademark infringement10 as well as unfair competition under
New York state law.11 Wiley’s primary claim was that
Kirtsaeng had infringed on Wiley’s exclusive right to distribute
copies of copyrighted works and had engaged in the
unauthorized importation of copyright goods. Kirtsaeng denied
liability and asserted that his actions were protected by the
“first sale” defense.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “FIRST SALE” DEFENSE
IN THE UNITED STATES
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The “first sale” defense is based on the common law
doctrine that restraints should not be placed on the alienation of
chattels. To illustrate this doctrine, Lord Coke gave an
example of a person who possessed a horse or some other
chattel and either gave it to a donee or sold it to a vendee on
the condition that that party was prohibited from giving or
selling it to anyone else. According to Coke such a condition
should be void since “it is against Trade and Traffic, and
bargaining and contracting between man and man; and it . . .
should ouster him of power given to him.”12
The “first sale” defense to copyright infringement claims
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was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1908 case of
Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus et al. d/b/a/ R.H. Macy &
Company (hereinafter Bobbs-Merrill).13 Bobbs-Merrill, the
publisher and copyright owner of a work of fiction, The
Castaway, had inserted a notice in the front cover of each copy
of the novel stating that: “The price of this book at retail is one
dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright.”14 Macy & Co. purchased multiple copies of the
book from wholesale dealers with the intention of reselling
them in its stores. Even though Macy & Co. was aware of
Bobbs-Merrill attempt to place limits on the retail price for the
book, it chose to sell its copies at the retail price of eighty-nine
cents per copy. Bobbs-Merrill responded by filing a lawsuit in
federal court seeking to restrain Macy & Co. from selling the
copyrighted books.
The Supreme Court began its discussion of Bobbs-Merrill’s
copyright claim by noting that federal copyright protection is a
statutory right that Congress established under its Article I, § 8
power to: “To promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” It
therefore agreed that it would be prudent to construe the
copyright statutes “with a view to effecting the purposes
intended by Congress . . . [and] ought not to be unduly
extended by judicial construction to include privileges not
intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to
deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress
intended to grant.”15 While the Court acknowledged that the
purpose of copyright law is “to secure to the author the right to
multiply copies of his work,”16 that purpose does not result in
limitless protection. Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States (1901) specifically gave the copy holder the
“sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing,
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copying, executing, finishing and vending [emphasis added]
the same.” But, according to the Court, that sole right to vend
did not include the right to restrict “the subsequent alienation
of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted
with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and
had given a satisfactory price for it.”17
Absent contract
provisions or license agreements limiting the subsequent sale
of the copyrighted material, copyright statutes do not give
copyright holders the right, after the sale of the book to a
purchaser, to restrict future retail sales of the book or the right
to specify that it may only be resold at a certain price. The
statutory right to vend is the right to first sell copies of the
protected material in quantities and at a price that is
satisfactory to the copyright holder. It is not the right to
control all future retail sales of those particular copies. “The
purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the
copyright, may sell it again, although he may not publish a new
edition of it.”18
The “first sale” doctrine, which was established by the
Court in Bobbs-Merrill, was codified in the Copyright Act of
190919 and in the Copyright Act of 1947.20 Both versions of
the law began by stating that the exclusive rights with regard to
copyrighted works include the right “to print, reprint, publish,
copy, and vend [emphasis added] the copyrighted work.”21
Congress went on to limit those rights subject to the BobbsMerrill “first sale” defense. Section 41 of the 1909 Act stated
that:
[T]he copyright is distinct from the property in
the material object copyrighted, and the sale or
conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material
object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of
the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the
copyright constitute a transfer of title to the
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material object but nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
possession of which has been lawfully
obtained.22 [Emphasis added.]
Section 27 of the 1947 Act subsequently adopted § 41 of the
1909 Act almost verbatim.
When the Copyright Act of 197623 was enacted, it included
a number of changes relevant to the “first sales” defense.
Among the exclusive rights granted to the “owner of the
copyright under this title” and enumerated in §106 was the
right to:
(3) To distribute [emphasis added] copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending.24
The exclusive rights found in §106 were limited, however, by
§§107 through 122. The “first sales” doctrine was addressed
in §109 (a)25 which specified that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of §106 (3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, [emphasis added]
or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or dispose of the possession of
that copy or phonorecord.
An additional provision of the Copyright Act specifically
placed limitations on the importation of copyrighted materials.
Section 602(a) provided, in part, that:
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Importation into the United States, without the
authority of the owner of copyright under this
title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that
have been acquired outside of the United States
is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute the copies or phonorecords under §
106, actionable under § 501.
Section 602 then listed three instances in which the importation
of copyrighted materials without the authority of the copyright
holder was not an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute under § 106. The exceptions included: the
importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or
for the use of the government (§ 602(a)(1)); the importation of
not more than one copy or phonorecord for the private use of,
but not for distribution by, the importer and the importation of
copies and phonorecords that are part of a person’s personal
luggage when he or she arrives from outside the U.S. (§
602(a)(2); and the importation by or for scholarly, educational,
or religious organizations for archival purposes or for library
lending purposes (§ 602(a)(1).
Section 501(a) (referred to in § 602(a)) stated, in part, that:
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by
§§ 106 through 122 or of the author as
provided in § 106A(a), or who imports copies
of phonorecords into the United States in
violation of § 602, is an infringer of the
copyright or right of the author, as the case
may be.
RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
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Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research
International, Inc.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.
(hereinafter Quality King),26 addressed the question of whether
the “first sale” defense should apply to copyrighted goods that
had been manufactured in the United States, sold for the first
time to a buyer in an international market, and then imported
back to and resold in the United States. L’anza was a
manufacturer and seller of hair care products—all of which
were made in the United States and affixed with copyrighted
labels. The L’anza products were expensive and were intended
for a more select clientele. Nonetheless, L’anza was concerned
that its targeted American consumers might not be willing to
pay the higher prices for its products if they were sold next to
less expensive hair care products in supermarkets or drug
stores. Consequently, it devised a marketing plan whereby it
would only sell its goods to U.S. distributors who limited their
sales to authorized retailers (barber shops, beauty salons, and
professional hair care colleges) within limited geographical
areas.27 L’anza also spent additional capital to advertise in
trade magazines and to offer special training sessions to its
authorized retailers.
Although L’anza’s sales were not restricted to the domestic
market, there are two signification differences between how the
company operated in the United States and how it operated
abroad. The first difference was that L’anza spent much less
money on advertising and promotion in the foreign markets.
The second was that it charged its foreign distributors prices
that were between 35% and 40% lower than it charged its
domestic distributors.
And, it was this global price
discrimination plan that eventually led to the lawsuit against
Quality King.
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In the early 1990s, L’anza’s distributor in the United
Kingdom sold a large quantity of its products (all with
company’s copyrighted labels) to a distributor in Malta at a
contract price that was calculated according to the foreign price
scheme. The goods, all of which had been made in the United
States and had been shipped to a foreign destination, eventually
made their way back to United States where they were resold
by Quality King to a number of unauthorized retailers. L’anza
subsequently sued Quality King as well as the Malta distributor
and the U.S. retailers for violating its exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted goods in the United
States.
The issue in Quality King was whether L’anza, the
copyright holder, could protect the exclusivity of its products in
the domestic market by limiting the importation back to the
United States of those same exact products. The statutory
problem was whether the copyright holder’s authority to limit
importation under § 602(a) was similar to its exclusive right to
distribute granted under § 106(3) and, therefore, limited by §§
107 through 120. Or, more specially, whether the “first sale”
doctrine (codified in § 109(a)) also applied to imported copies.
The Court, in a unanimous decision delivered by Justice John
Paul Stevens, concluded that the rights of a copyright holder
under § 602(a) were limited to the same extent that they were
limited under § 106(3).28
The Supreme Court found no merit in L’anza’s claim that §
602(a) prohibited foreign distributors from reselling L’anza’s
products to U.S. vendors who had not been able to buy them
from L’anza’s authorized domestic distributors. The Court
distinguished between L’anza’s incorrect claim that § 602
categorically prohibited the unauthorized importation of
copyrighted goods and Quality King’s claim that, while an

2014 / Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. / 52

importation might be an infringement of exclusive right to
distribute copies under § 106(3), that right was subject to the
limitations enumerated in §§ 107 to 120.29 In Bobbs-Merrill,
the exclusive right “to vend” had been limited by the “first
sale” doctrine. Under § 106(3), the exclusive right “to
distribute” was similarly limited by the codification of the
“first sale” doctrine in § 109(a). Therefore, since § 602(a) only
applied to the unauthorized importation of goods that was an
infringement of an exclusive right under § 106(3) and since
that right was limited by the “first sales” doctrine found in
§109(a), § 602(a) could not be used to prevent the domestic
and foreign owners of the already distributed goods from
importing and reselling them in the United States.30
L’anza had presented the Court with two statutory
arguments. The first was that the application of the “first sale”
defense in the case would have rendered § 602(a) and its three
exceptions superfluous “unless it cover[d] non-piratical
(“lawfully made”) copies sold by the copyright holder, because
importation nearly always implie[d] a first sale.”31 The second
was that the § 501 definition of an “infringer” referred to two
distinct violations—those described in §106 and those referred
to in § 602. The Court rejected both arguments on the grounds
that neither adequately accounted for why § 602(a) contained
the phrase “under § 106.”
With regards to L’anza’s first argument, the Court identified
three instances in which the application of the “first sale”
defense had not rendered § 602(a) superfluous. While it was
true that the Copyright Act had explicitly prohibited the
importation of “piratical” or unauthorized copies long before
the enactment of § 602(a),32 that prohibition had subsequently
been incorporated into § 602(b) of the current Act, which
stated that: “In the case where the making of the copies or
phonorecords would have constituted an infringement of
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copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is
prohibited.” L’anza had argued that since § 602(b) specifically
referred to pirated goods, § 602(a) had to apply to something
else--nonpiratical (“lawfully made”) copies. Although the
Court disagreed with L’anza’s conclusion, it pointed out that
even if § 602(a) only applied to piratical goods, it still provided
the copyright holder with something that was quite
significant—a private remedy against the importer that was not
available under § 602(b).33 The Court then pointed to the fact
that while the § 109(a) “first sale” defense could be asserted by
the “owner” of a lawfully made copy, it was unavailable, in a §
602(a) action, to nonowners such as bailees, licensees,
consignees, or others whose possession of the copy was
unlawful. Finally, the Court noted that there was a third
category of cases (other than those involving pirated copies of
copies “lawfully made under this title”) that was covered by §
602(a) Those were cases involving copies that had been
“lawfully made” under the copyright laws of some other
country.34
The Court next turned to L’anza’s second argument
involving the proper meaning of § 501 definition of an
“infringer.” Section 501 specifically stated that an “infringer”
was: “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by §§ 106 through 118 or of the
author as provided in §106A or who imports copies or
phonorecords into the United States in violation of § 602.”
L’anza had claimed that the § 501 references to § 106 and §
602 were, in fact, references to two discrete violations.
Although the Court admitted that “the use of the words “or
who imports,” rather than words such as “including one who
imports,” was more consistent with L’anza’s claim that a
violation of § 602 is distinct from a violation of § 106,” it cited
other provisions in the statute to contradict that conclusion.
The Court compared how the prohibited importation under §
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602(a) was unambiguously stated to be an infringement of the
exclusive right “under § 106, actionable under § 501” while the
infringement referred to in § 106A35 (which was also crossreferenced with § 501), stated that it was “independent of the
exclusive rights provided in §106.” This suggested to the
Court that, while §106A described an independent right, §
602(a) violations were, in fact, more properly identified as a
species of § 106 violations. 36
The Court found even more persuasive the fact that § 106
rights were subject to all of the provisions of §§ 107-120 and
not just the § 109(a) “first sale” defense. If § 602(a) were an
independent right, none of the limits provided for in §§ 107120 would be applicable. Consequently, a foreign publisher,
unable to assert the §107 “fair use” defense, would be liable for
importing a newspaper to the United States if its book review
column included excerpts from a U.S. copyrighted book. The
Court, citing the importance of the “fair use” defense to
publishers of scholarly works, found it “difficult to believe that
Congress [had] intended to impose an absolute ban on the
importation of all such works containing any copying of
material protected by a United States copyright.”37 Such a
result would be counter to the fundamental purpose of the
Copyright Act, the promotion of the “useful Arts” through the
rewarding of creativity and the protection of original works.
While the consequences of adopting L’anza’s construction
would certainly aid a company in its marketing of copyrighted
materials in different global market sectors, it would also
“inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”38
The Court concluded by declining to engage in a policy
discussion over the wisdom of placing governmental restraints
on the “gray market” and the use of “parallel importation.”39 It
chose instead to restrict itself to interpreting the text of the
Copyright Act that was provided by Congress. And, the Court,
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having completed that task, ruled in favor of Quality King
Distributors.
It should be noted that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a
brief concurring opinion in Quality King that anticipated the
next “first sale” issue that would present itself to the Court.
The sole purpose of her concurring opinion was to attempt to
limit the Quality King holding to cases involving the “round
trip” journey of copyrighted copies from the United States to
locations abroad and then back to the United States. As far as
she was concerned, the holding did not resolve the issue for
cases in which the alleged infringing goods had been
manufactured abroad.
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega
In 2010, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to a
Ninth Circuit case40 involving allegations of copyright
distribution and importation infringements under §§ 106(3) and
602(a). The issue in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega
(hereinafter Omega)41 was whether the holding in Quality King
limited the use of the “first sale” defense to cases in which the
copies of the copyrighted work had either been made or
previously sold in the United States with the authority of the
copyright owner.
Omega, a Swiss manufacturer of high quality watches (all
of which were engraved on their underside with a U.S.
copyrighted “Omega Globe Design), participated in the
international market through a network of authorized
distributors and retailers. Costco Wholesale Corp. (hereinafter
Costco), which was neither an authorized distributor nor
retailer, purchased the copyrighted Omega watches from the
“gray market” for resale in its discount stores.
In this
particular case, the watches, which Omega had produced in
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Switzerland and sold to authorized distributors overseas, were
at some point purchased by unidentified third parties who sold
them to ENE Limited, a New York company, who, in turn, sold
them to Costco. While the initial foreign sale of the watches
had been authorized by Omega, their subsequent importation
into the United States had not been. Costco’s legal response to
the Omega lawsuit was the same as Quality King’s to L’anza—
it asserted the “first sale” defense. Both parties filed motions
for summary judgment. The trial court, without comment,
ruled in favor of Costco. When Omega appealed the case to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the sole issue
was whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Quality King had
overruled the appellate court’s precedent that limited the “first
sale” defense to copies of copyrighted materials legally made
in the United States. The three justice panel reversed the lower
court decision on the grounds that the “first sale” defense was
unavailable to the Costco.
The Court of Appeals, relying on Quality King, held that the
copyright holder’s claims depended on the relationship
between §§ 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a) of the Copyright Act.
Prior to Quality King, case law in the Ninth Circuit had
differentiated between “round trip” importation cases (in which
the copies of the copyrighted material had been lawfully made
in the United States, exported to an authorized foreign
distributor, sold to unidentified third parties abroad, and
shipped back to United States without the authorization of the
copyright holder) and cases in which the copy of the material
had been made abroad and subsequently imported to the United
States without the copyright holder’s permission. In BMG
Music v. Perez (hereinafter BMG),42 the appellate court had
held that §109(a) could not be used as a defense to a § 602(a)
claim if the goods in question had been manufactured abroad
since §109(a) only applied to goods “lawfully made under this
title.” And, “lawfully made under this title” “grant[ed] first

57 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

sale protection only to copies legally made and sold in the
United States.”43 Parfums Givency, Inc. v. Drug Emporium,
Inc.44 modified the holding in BMG by creating an exception
that would allow the § 109(a) defense to be used in § 602(a)
cases even though the copies of the copyrighted material had
not been made in the United States so long as an authorized
first sale had occurred in the United States.45 That exception
was subsequently followed by the Ninth Circuit in the case of
Denbicare U.S.A, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.46
In Omega, the question was what impact, if any, Quality
King would have on the Ninth Circuit’s construction of §
109(a). The first issue to be resolved was whether the holding
in Quality King applied to all varieties of importation cases.
Referring to Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, the Court
of Appeals held that Quality King was limited to “round trip”
importation cases. This conclusion was supported by the
observation that the Supreme Court had neither discussed the
scope of § 109(a) nor defined the meaning of “lawfully made
under this title.”47
The next issue was whether the Ninth Circuit’s general rule
that § 109(a) was limited to copies that had been “legally made
in the United States” was irreconcilable with Quality King.
The basis for the Circuit Court’s rule was its presumption that
U.S. laws should not be applied extraterritorially unless the
contrary is clearly indicated by statute.48 For the “first sale”
defense to apply to copies made abroad would require the
acknowledgment that they were “lawfully made under this
title.” And, that “would ascribe legality under the Copyright
Act to conduct that occurs entirely outside of the United States,
not withstanding the absence of a clear expression of
congressional intent in favor of extraterritoriality.”49 The
Circuit Court also cited the example used by the Court in
Quality King50 whereby a U.S. copyright holder gave the
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exclusive U.S. distribution rights to the publisher of the U.S.
edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the
publisher of the British edition. The Supreme Court had noted
that:
[P]resumably only those [copies] made by the
publisher in the United States edition would be
‘lawfully made under this title’ within the
meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine
would not provide the publisher of the British
edition who decided to sell in the American
market with a defense to an action under
§602(a).
This further suggested that “lawfully made under this title”
referred exclusively to the copies of the U.S. copyrighted
material that had been made in the United States.
The Ninth Circuit, in Costco, concluded that its general rule
limiting the “first sale” defense to copies of copyrighted
materials legally made in the United States was compatible
with Quality King and remained binding precedent. As a
result, the § 109(a) defense to the claims under §§ 106(3) and
602(a) was unavailable to Costco and the lower court decision
in favor of Costco was reversed and the case was remanded to
the District Court.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. But, it did so by means of a per curium
opinion, without comment, that was issued by an equally
divided Court. Justice Elena Kagan took no part either in the
consideration or the decision in the case.
THE APPLICATION OF THE “FIRST SALE DEFENSE” TO
KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
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The primary claim in the Wiley case was that Kirtsaeng had
infringed on Wiley’s §§ 106(3) and 602(a) rights when he
arranged to have foreign editions of textbooks send him in the
United States and when he sold them for a profit without
obtaining the authorization of the copyright holder. The central
issue was whether a §109(a) “first sales” defense was available
to Kirtsaeng even though the textbooks had been published
abroad and the first sale had taken place abroad.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
During the pre-trial proceedings, Kirtsaeng had submitted to
the trial court a proposed instruction to the jury charging that
the “first sale” doctrine could be used as a defense against a
claim of copyright infringement.51 Judge Donald Pogue denied
Kirtsaeng’s request and further instructed him not to raise the
“first sale” defense during trial on the grounds that “[t]here is
no indication that the imported books at issue here were
manufactured pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act . . . [and,]
[t]o the contrary, the textbooks introduced as evidence purport,
on their face, to have been published outside of the United
States.”52
Pogue’s decision was based on his determination that goods
“lawfully made under this title” applied to goods actually made
within U.S. borders and not to goods made abroad but in a
manner consistent with the Copyright Act. The process by
which Pogue arrived at that decision began with a review of the
structure of the Act. Unfortunately, that “[did] not provide a
determinative conclusion.”53
He next analyzed of the
legislative history of §§ 109 and 602—which also proved to be
inclusive.54 His consideration of the public policy issues was
equally frustrating—since valid arguments could be made for
either interpretation of § 109(a).55 In the end, Pogue based his
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decision on dicta found in Quality King. The dicta in question
was the Court’s statement that “§ 602(a) [would] appl[y] to a
category of copies that are neither piratical nor “lawfully made
under this title.”56 And, the category of not “lawfully made
under this title” “encompassed copies that were ‘lawfully
made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead,
under the law of some other country.”57 Since the books sold
by Kirtsaeng had been manufactured abroad, they were not
“lawfully made” under the Act, and “first sale” defense
provided for in § 109(a) was inapplicable.
Prior to trial, Kirtsaeng had sought to preclude the
introduction of evidence relating to his online “PayPal” sales
records (including the gross revenues from his sale of the
foreign editions of Wiley textbooks) and the profits he had
earned on unrelated sales activities. The trial judge granted the
motion but only with regard to evidence of profits earned from
books produced by other publishers (subject to a number of
exceptions). When the case was finally given to the jury,
Kirtsaeng also objected to jury instructions relating to the
assessment of statutory damages. The jury found Kirtsaeng
liable for willful infringement of the Copyright Act and
imposed damages of $75,000 for each of the eight Wiley books
in question.58 Kirtsaeng appealed the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
The principal question on appeal (which was one of first
impression for the Second Circuit) was whether the “first sale”
doctrine could be asserted as a defense in an action alleging a
copyright infringement for copies of copyrighted materials that
had been manufactured abroad. The key concern was whether
those materials had been “lawfully made under this title.” The
Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision delivered by Justice José
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Cabranes, affirmed the lower court’s ruling and held that the
§109(a) defense was inapplicable.
The appellate court’s de nova review of the case began with
an acknowledgement that there was “some tension” between
the broad control that § 602(a)(1) gave to the copyright holder
with regard to the direct or indirect importation into the United
States of the copies of the copyrighted goods and the § 109(a)
limits placed on the copyright holder with regard to the
distribution of those goods after their initial sale.59 Even
though the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Quality
King had held that § 109(a) limited the copyright holder’s
rights under §602(a), the Second Circuit was hesitant to apply
that ruling to Wiley. The reason for that hesitation was based
on a key difference between the two cases—the fact that while
the goods in Quality King had been manufactured in the United
States, the goods in Wiley had been manufactured abroad. The
Court of Appeals cited Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in
Quality King (which attempted to limit the Court’s holding to
“round trip” journeys) and Steven’s “instructive dicta” (which
suggested that § 602(a) “encompasses copies that may not be
subject to the first sale doctrine—e.g., copies that are lawfully
made under the law of another country”)60 as well as Steven’s
hypothetical description of the limits on the exclusive rights of
an American publisher and distributor of an American edition
of a book and a British publisher and distributor of a British
edition of the same book).61 These references seemed to
suggest that the Supreme Court had concluded that copyrighted
material manufactured abroad were not subject to the “first
sale” defense. But, such a suggestion was mudded by the
Supreme Court’s failure to transform the dicta in Quality King
into a compatible holding in Omega.
In order to clarify the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made
under this title,” the appellate court focused on the text of §
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109(a) and the structure of the Copyright Act. Understanding
the text of § 109(a) turned out to be problematic given the fact
that the word “made” was not a term of art under the Copyright
Act62 and the word “under” was something of a “chameleon”
that the courts have only understand by “draw[ing] on its
meaning from its context.”63 Attempts to understand the words
in the context of the Act were equally frustrating. If the phrase
“lawfully made under this title” was interpreted to mean
“lawfully made in the United States,” it would be compatible
with the general presumption that statutes do not apply
extraterritorially. (Such a presumption had, in fact, been
adopted in previous Second Circuit copyright cases.)64 But,
such an interpretation would also ignore the fact that the
Copyright Act also explicitly took into account activities
occurring abroad.65 After considering a number of alternative
possibilities, the majority opinion concluded that the “relevant
text [was] simply unclear” and, in fact, the phrase ““lawfully
made under this title” could plausibly be interpreted to mean
any number of things, including: (1) “manufactured in the
United States,” (2) “any work made that is subject to the
protection of this title,” or (3) “lawfully made under this title
had this title been applicable.””66
Since the appellate court found the text of § 109(a) to be
“utterly ambiguous,” it decided “to adopt an interpretation of §
109(a) that best comport[ed] with both § 602(a) and the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King.”67 Two assumptions
concerning § 602(a) convinced the majority to deny the “first
sale” defense to cases involving copies of copyrighted works
made abroad. The first was the assumption that § 602(a) was
intended to give copyright holders some degree of flexibility in
how they divided and treated their international and domestic
markets for the same copyrighted work. Such an intention led
to the conclusion that the “first sale” defense should be limited
to copies “lawfully made in the United States” so that
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copyright holders, in most instances,68 could control the
circumstances in which foreign made copies could be legally
imported into the United States. The second assumption was
that § 602(a) would be irrelevant in the vast majority of cases if
the “first sale” defense was allowed to apply to every copy
manufactured abroad that were either made “subject to
protection under Title 17,” or “consistent with the requirements
of Title 17 had Title 17 been applicable.” Consequently, it had
to be read in such a way as to limit the “first sale” defense to
works manufactured in the United States.
The Second Circuit Court dismissed the Supreme Court’s
affirmation of the contradictory holding in Omega and focused
instead on “what the Justices appear to have had in mind when
deciding Quality King.”69 It followed the District Court’s lead
and relied on the dicta that found the scope of § 602(a) to be
broader than § 109(a)—at least in so far as it “applie[d] to a
category of copies that [we]re neither piratical nor “lawfully
made under this title” [and] [t]hat category encompassed copies
that were ‘lawfully made’ not under the United States
Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other
country.”70 The appellate court concluded that since, “in the
[Supreme] Court’s view, copies “lawfully made” under the
laws of a foreign country—though perhaps not produced in
violation of any United States laws—are not necessarily
“lawfully made” insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) of
our Copyright Act,”71 the District Court was correct when it
decided that Kirtsaeng could not assert a “first sale” defense.72
U.S. SUPREME COURT
Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Kirtsaeng v.
Wiley & Sons, Inc., unequivocally extended the “first sale”
defense to the owners of copies of copyrighted goods that had
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been manufactured abroad. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered
the opinion for the majority of the Court that included Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito, Sonya Sotomayer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Kagan filed
a separate concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.
The dissenting opinion, filed by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and by Justice
Antonin Scalia (except for Parts III and V-B-1).
The Court granted a writ of certiorari in the Wiley case, in
part, to resolve the different ways that the U.S. Circuit Courts
had handled the issue of whether the “first sale” defense
applied to copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The
Second and Ninth Circuits had taken the view that the phrase in
§109(3) referring to copies “lawfully made under this title”
created a geographical limit on the scope of the “first sale”
defense. The geographical limit recognized by the Second
Circuit only subjected copies “made in territories in which the
Copyright Act is law” [emphasis added)73 to the “first sale”
defense. The Second Circuit concluded that the “first sale”
defense could apply to copies that had been “manufactured
domestically” but not to copies manufactured “outside of the
United States.” The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, extended
its geographically limited application of the “first sale” defense
to cases involving copies that had been lawfully made in the
United States as well as copies that had been lawfully made
outside the United but had been initially sold in the United
States with the copyright owner’s permission.74 Both the
Second and Ninth Circuits’ geographical interpretations
precluded Kirtsaeng from successfully asserting a “first sale”
defense with regard to the Wiley (Asia) books. Even though
the U.S. copyright holder had given permission to Wiley (Asia)
to make the copies abroad, the copyright holder had never
given anyone who bought copies of those books permission to
resell them. And, that was the result regardless of whether the
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copy had been purchased at a retail store, over the internet, or
at a library sale.75
The Third Circuit had rejected a geographical approach on
the grounds that limiting the “first sale” doctrine only to copies
made within the United States “d[id] not fit comfortably within
the scheme of the Copyright Act.”76
It preferred an
interpretation of the words “lawfully made under this title” to
mean made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the
Copyright Act. Under this non-geographical approach, the
“first sale” defense could apply to copyrighted materials that
had been made abroad according to the requirements of
American copyright law and with the authorization of the
copyright holder.77
In order to evaluate the different approaches taken by the
Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court focused on the language of
§109(a) and its context within the Copyright Act, the common
law history of the “first sale” defense, and the practical
consequences of adopting the conflicting interpretations. The
Supreme Court’s linguistic analysis favored a nongeographical
interpretation of “lawfully made under this title.” That meant
that it extended to copies that had been made “in accordance
with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. The Court
was impressed by the fact that a literal reading gave each word
in the five-word phrase a distinct purpose. “Lawfully made”
copies were distinguished from copies that were unlawfully
made. Since the dictionary meaning of the word “under” can
mean “in accordance with,78 “under this title” could be easily
be read to mean “in accordance” with a particular standard of
lawfulness (i.e. the Copyright Act).
For the majority, the
nongeographical interpretation was simple, promoted a
traditional copyright objective (the combating of piracy), and
made word-by-word linguistic sense.79
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In comparison, the Court found the geographical
interpretation favored by Wiley to be linguistically wanting. In
order for the geographical interpretation to work, the emphasis
in the phrase “lawfully made under this title” would have had
to be placed on the word “under.” The suggestion that “under
this title” meant “in conformance with the Copyright Act
where the Copyright Act is applicable” would not work unless
the reader was also able to show that the Act was “applicable
only in the United States.”80 And, that was a serious obstacle
for Wiley to overcome—especially since nothing in the phrase
“under this title” (including the word “under”) could be
interpreted to mean “where.”81
An additional, and more serious, problem with the
geographical interpretation arose when an attempt was made to
read the geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or
the equivalent). The Court, by way of example, suggested that
just because the Act did not instantly protect an American
copyright holder from unauthorized piracy occurring abroad
did not make the Act inapplicable to copies made abroad.
Foreign-printed pirated works were clearly subject to the Act
under § 602(a)(2), which states that:
Importation into the United States or exportation
from the United States, without the authority of
the owner of the copyright under this title, of
copies or phonorecords, the making of which
either constituted an infringement of copyright,
or which would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been
applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under
§§ 501 and 506 (emphasis added).
The Court also referred to § 104(a), in which works “subject to
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protection under this title” included unpublished works
“without regard to the nationality or of the author,” and to
§104(b), in which protection also was provided for works “first
published” in any one of the nearly 180 nations that are parties
to a copyright treaty with the United States.82
Finally, the Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit’s
extension of its geographical interpretation (to include copies
manufactured abroad but first sold in the United States with the
American copyholder’s permission) to be linguistically
disingenuous. There was simply no way to interpret “lawfully
made under this title” to be half-geographical and halfnongeographical.
If the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
prevailed, a publisher, which printed its books abroad and
authorized their importation and sale in the United States,
could prohibit students from reselling the textbooks back to a
campus bookstore at the end of the semester. And, that was an
unacceptable consequence and a misreading of “lawfully made
under this title.”
The Court next reviewed the “first sale” defense from both a
historical and contemporary statutory context—and concluded
that Congress was concerned about something other than
geographical limits when it enacted the present version of §
109(a).
The “first sale” defense, which was initially
established as a statutory defense in the Copyright Act of
1909,83 stated that: “[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained” [emphasis added]. Since there was no reference to
geography in the original “first sale” provision, the Court was
interested in determining whether the text of the current
statutory provision, which applies to those who are “owners” of
a copy of a copyrighted work that was “lawfully made under
this title,” was altered to address geographical concerns. The
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Court noted that the difference in the two statutory provisions
was not based on any concern for geographical limitations but
rather on a concern to limit who was eligible to assert the “first
sale” limitation. In the 1909 Act, the right belonged to
whoever lawfully possessed the copy—which meant that it
might be claimed by bailees and lessees (such as owners of
movie theaters who had leased copyrighted films from movie
distributors or filmmakers) as well as actual owners. Since
Congress was not satisfied with that result, it changed the
wording of the current Act to restrict the defense to the
“owners” of copies “lawfully made under the title.” The
legislative history leading up to the revisions in the current Act
seems to support the conclusion that it was a “who” rather than
a “where” issue that precipitated the statutory language.84
Another relevant change in the current Act (which phased
out the “manufacturing clause”) reflected a concern that
materials manufactured abroad and materials manufactured in
the United States should be accorded “equal treatment.”85 A
geographical interpretation of the “first sale” defense would
frustrate the purpose of the “equal treatment” principle since it
would give the holder of a U.S. copyright (who might be a
foreign national) the right to permanently control the U.S.
distribution chain (including sales, resales, and gifts) for copies
of the materials that were printed abroad--but not for copies
printed in the United States.86
The final contextual argument raised by the Court related to
the normal presumption that words lawfully made under the
same title should carry the same meaning when they occur in
different (but related) sections. Sections 109(c), 109(e),
110(1), and 106 of the Copyright Act all contain the phrase
“lawfully made under this title.”87
The Court found
unacceptable the suggestion that it adopt a nongeographical
reading of the phrase in the first three cases and a geographical
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reading only for the provision relating to the “first sale”
defense. Such a result would be inconsistent and contrary to
the result that Congress had intended.
One of the reasons that the Court reviewed the common law
background of the “first sale” defense was to see if the
presumption, that when Congress passes legislation in an area
that was previously governed by common law, it does so with
the intention of retaining the substance of the common law,
held in this case.88 The common law basis for the “first sale”
defense was the rule that restraints should not be placed on the
alienation of chattels. Lord Coke’s articulation of that rule in
the early 17th century emphasized the importance of enabling
buyers to freely dispose of property that they had previously
acquired.89 That same common law rule was used by the
Supreme Court, in the case of Bobbs-Merrill,90 to create the
“first sale” defense for copyrighted materials. Congress
subsequently codified that defense (the predecessor of §
109(a)) in the Copyright Act of 1909. After reviewing Coke’s
common law rule, the Court’s precedent in Bobbs-Merrill, and
the codification of that precedent in the 1909 Act, the Court
was unable to identify any geographical distinctions that would
preclude the “straight forward” application of the BobbsMerrill “first sale” defense to authorized copies made abroad.91
The Court, in a pragmatic turn, next considered the impact
that a geographical interpretation would have on a basic
constitutional copyright objective—“To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl.
8). Libraries would have to get permission from the copyright
holders of books published abroad and obtained by the library
before they could circulate or otherwise distribute them. 92 A
large portion of the used book business would be in jeopardy.93
American purchasers of technology dependent items (such as
cars, microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, and computers)
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that had been made abroad and that contained one or more
copyrighted software programs or packaging, would not be
able to resell those items without obtaining the permission of
the holders of each copyrighted component.94 Retailers would
face the uncertainty of copyright infringement suits for the
many copyrighted items that were manufactured abroad and
purchased by the retailers for the purpose of resell in their
stores.95 And, museum directors would face the prospect of
having to obtain the permission of the copyright owners of
foreign produced art (which may have already been sold or
donated to a foreign museum by the copyright holder) before
they could display that art in the United States.96 While Wiley
and the dissenting opinion dismissed these “horribles” as
“artificial inventions,” the majority of the Court was less
sanguine and concluded that “the practical problems . . .
described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come
about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in
the light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to
America.”97
The majority opinion concluded by addressing four
arguments raised in the dissenting opinion. The first was
whether the Court’s unanimous decision in Quality King
supported a geographical interpretation. Under Quality King,
the Court had ruled that the Copyright Act’s “importation
provision” (now § 602(a)(1) and then § 602(a)) did not bar the
owner of copies of American made copyrighted materials
purchased abroad from importing those materials back into the
United States if the U.S. copyright holder had authorized the
first sale and original exportation of the goods but had not
authorized the return importation. Just as the copyright
holder’s exclusive right to distribute the goods under § 106 was
subject to the § 109(a) “first sale” defense so to was the
copyright holder’s right to limit the importation of previously
sold copies of those goods under the “importation provision.”
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The dissent had argued that if § 602(a)(1) did not apply to
pirated goods or to owners of lawfully made copies, it would in
fact be superfluous. The majority countered that (without
permission, and subject to the exceptions in § 602(a)(3)), the
“importation provision” would still prohibit the importing of
copies that were lawfully made abroad where “(1) a foreign
publisher operating as the licensee of an American publisher
prints copies of a book overseas but, prior to any authorized
sale, seeks to send them to the United States; (2) a foreign
printer or other manufacturer (if not the “owner” for purposes
of § 109(a), e.g. before an authorized sale) sought to send
copyrighted goods to the United States ; (3) a book publisher
transports copies to a wholesaler” and the wholesaler (not yet
the owner) sends them to the United States, . . . or (4) a foreign
film distributer, having leased films for distribution, or any
other licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to send to the United
States.”98
The Court also rejected the suggestion that the example, in
Quality Court, of the copyright holder who gave the exclusive
American distributions rights to a publisher in the United
States and the exclusive British distribution rights to a
publisher in England was controlling in this case. That
example had concluded with the statement that “presumably
only those [copies] made by the publisher of the United States
edition would be ‘lawfully made under the title’ within the
meaning of § 109(a).”99 Wiley had argued that that statement
supported its geographical interpretation of the current §
602(a)(1) (previously § 602(a)) since it meant that even books
published abroad under a valid license did not qualify as works
“lawfully made under this title.” The majority dismissed the
Quality Court statement as “pure dictum” and as “unnecessary
dictum” that was contained in a rebuttal to a counterargument.
The meaning of “lawfully made under this title” was neither an
issue in Quality King nor an issue that had been fully argued.
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Since the Court’s consideration of the issue in the current case
had demonstrated that the dicta was, in fact, incorrect, it is not
bound by that dicta.100
The Court next addressed the dissent’s assertion that the
legislative history supported its geographical interpretation of §
109(a). The historical events to which the minority referred
occurred over a decade before the enactment of the 1979 Act
and reflected the concerns of that the representatives of the
book, record, and film industries had made to the Registrar of
Copyrights regarding the difficulty of dividing international
markets. The Registrar of Copyrights had responded to those
concerns by proposing two draft provisions. A report prepared
by the Copyright Office had explained that the second draft
provision would have made the importing of a copy without the
permission of the copyright holder a violation of the exclusive
right of the copyright holder where the copyright holder had
authorized the making of copies in the foreign country for
distribution only in that country. The Court found that it could
better ascertain the meaning of § 109(a) (as it was enacted in
the 1979 Act) by placing greater weight on the congressional
report accompanying § 109(a) (which was written in 1975)101
rather than on the remarks of industry representatives
concerning § 602 (which were made in 1964).102 The
congressional report (referred to by the majority) reiterated the
importance of the “first sale” doctrine and explained the
nongeographical purposed for the words “lawfully under this
title.”103
The Court conceded the validity of the third claim raised by
the dissent—that a nongeographical interpretation of § 109(a)
would seriously disrupt attempts by publishers and copyright
holders to divide foreign and domestic markets. But, that was
not seen to be a problem since there is no basic principle of
copyright law that would suggest that publishers were entitled

73 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

to the right to charge different prices for the same book in
different geographical markets. Art. I, §8, cl. 8 of the U.S.
Constitution gave Congress the power to “secur[e]” to
“authors” for “limited [t]imes” the “exclusive [r]ight to their . .
. [w]ritings.” While the Founders conceived of that as a
limited right to exclude competition, there is nothing to suggest
that they thought it included “a right to divide markets or a
concomitant right to charge different purchasers different
prices for the same book, say to increase or maximize gain.”104
The inclusion of the “first sale” defense in copyright law
placed limits on a copyright holder’s ability to divide domestic
markets. In reading the Copyright Act, the Court could find
nothing to indicate that Congress believed that copyright
owners should have more power to divide international
markets.105
The final issue raised by the dissent was its concern that the
Court’s decision in Wiley would launch United States copyright
law into an unprecedented regime of “international
exhaustion”—which the United States opposed.106 This latter
claim was neither made by the Solicitor General in the amicus
brief nor in oral arguments. In fact, when pressed, the Solicitor
General had admitted in oral argument that reading the
Copyright Act to allow the copyright holder to retain perpetual
downstream control was worse than the restriction of market
segmentation.107
Concurring Opinion
Justice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion that was
joined by Justice Samuel Alito. While she fully agreed with
the Court’s opinion, she thought it was necessary to point out
the way Congress could address the problems that might
inevitably result from reading the Wiley decision in conjunction
with Quality King. When read together the two decisions
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“constrict the scope of § 602(a)(1)’s ban on unauthorized
importation.”108 But that was only the case because Quality
King did not apply the importation ban to copies receiving
first-sale protection under § 109(a). To read the ruling in Wiley
(that copies “lawfully made under this title” extend to
copyright copies made abroad) with the ruling in Quality King
would, in fact, diminish of the scope of § 602(a)(1) “to a fairly
esoteric set of applications.”109
But, if such a result was
unacceptable to Congress, then Congress should “recognize
Quality King—and not [Wiley]—as the culprit.”110 Congress
might have been concerned with market segmentation when it
enacted § 602(a)(1). It might have intended copyright owners
to be able to divide the market in the very way Wiley sought.
But, it was also likely that Congress had not intended to
remove first-sale protection from every copy manufactured
abroad. The more likely objective was to allow the copyright
holder to continue to control the import of those goods even
when the first-sale doctrine applied. Kagan rejected the
dissenting justices “misconstrued” interpretation of §109(a)—
which was meant “to restore §602(a)(1) to its purposely
rightful function of enabling copyright holders to segment
international markets.”111 At the same time, she suggested that
if Congress wanted copyright owners to have a greater ability
to restrict importation and to divide markets, it should address
the Court’s decision in Quality King.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, and (in part)
by Justice Antonin Scalia, found the majority’s interpretation
of the Copyright Act to be “at odds with Congress’ aim to
protect owners against the unauthorized importation of lowpriced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works.”112 In
order to determine whether the unauthorized importation of
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foreign-made copies was a copyright infringement under U.S.
law, Ginsburg focused on the § 602(a)(1) importation ban and
its interpretation in Quality King. In that instance, the Court
had refused to apply the § 602(a)(1) ban to the round trip
importation back to the United States of copyrighted materials
that had been made in the United States and subsequently sold
abroad. That was because the § 602(a)(1) ban only applied to
materials had been “lawfully made” under the laws of some
country other than the United States. Ginsburg argued that
since the books imported by Kirtsaeng had not been “lawfully
made” in the United States, the “first sale” doctrine under §
109(a) did not apply113 and “the unauthorized importation
constitute[d] copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).”114
Ginsburg pointed to the text of the Copyright Act to show a
strong Congressional intent to provide copyright holders “with
a potent remedy against the importation of foreign-made copies
of their copyrighted works.”115
One way for that
Congressional intent to be realized would be to limit the
application of the “lawfully made under this title” phrase in
§109(a) to those instances in which the materials in question
were governed by and conducted in compliance with the U.S.
Copyright Act. Since the Court had already held that the
Copyright Act d[id] not apply extraterritorially, Wiley’s
printing of the textbooks abroad was neither governed by the
Copyright Act and nor “lawfully made under [the Act].”116
The dissenting opinion’s exegesis of the phrase, “lawfully
made under this title,” questioned the majority’s understanding
of the term “under” and argued that it should have been
interpreted it to mean the “signal[ing] of a relationship of
subjection, where one thing is governed or regulated by
another.”117 Ginsburg observed that “only by disregarding this
established meaning of “under” c[ould] the Court arrive at the
conclusion that Wiley’s foreign- manufactured textbooks were
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“lawfully made under” U.S. copyright law, even though the
law did not govern their creation.”118
The dissent then undertook a review the legislative history
of §602(a)(1) (which Scalia did not join). The review focused
on the role of the U.S. Copyright Office in the lengthy revision
effort that culminated in the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1976. The dissent took exception with the majority’s view
that the legislative history was “inconclusive.” It claimed
instead that the history confirmed what the “plain text” of the
Act conveyed . . . that the intention of § 602(a)(1) was to
“provide copyright owners with a remedy against the
unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies of their
works, even if those copies were made and sold abroad with
the copyright owner’s authorization.”119
Another concern raised by Ginsburg was the inconsistency
between the majority’s decision and the position that the
United States has taken with regard to the international trade
issue of national versus international exhaustions of protection
for intellectual property.120 While the minority acknowledged
that there was no international consensus on the issue of
“whether the sale in one country of a good incorporating
protected intellectual property exhausts the intellectual
property owner’s right to control the distribution of the good
elsewhere,”121 it noted that the United States had rejected the
international exhaustion rule and taken the position that
domestic copyright owners should be able to prevent the
unauthorized copies of their work sold abroad.122 The minority
was concerned that the majority’s ruling in favor of an
international-exhaustion rule (that benefits U.S. consumers but
could disadvantage foreign holders of U.S. copyrights) “risks
undermining the United States’ credibility on the world
stage.”123
The dissenting opinion concluded with a discussion of the

77 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

“parade of horribles” that the majority feared would occur if
the Court had not applied the “first sale” defense in this case.
Libraries would not be closed, used-book dealers would not be
put out of business, art museums would not be crippled, and
the resale of a wide range of consumer goods would not be
prevented. While the occurrence of those kinds of events
would be horrible, Ginsburg suggested that existing copyright
laws and precedents would prevent those events from actually
occurring.124
CONCLUSION
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc was very much about
the competing interests of copyright holders and the owners of
copies of copyrighted materials. But, it was about those
competing interests in a world of increasingly borderless
markets. The first time purchasers of the copies of copyrighted
material may be individual consumers, small-time
entrepreneurs, big box stores, or on-line shopping networks. In
Quality King, those purchasers were allowed to use the “first
sale” defense against copyright holders who produced their
copies in the United States and shipped them abroad with the
expectation that those copies would not return to compete in
the domestic market without the copyright holder’s
authorization. After Quality King, many copyright holders
thought that the solution might be to manufacture and sell the
copies of their copyrighted materials abroad with the
expectation that those copies would be prevented from being
imported to the United States under § 602(a)(1). But, that
solution has proved to be disappointing since the Court’s Wiley
decision made the “first sale” defense applicable to those
situations. There is now no doubt that Wiley will facilitate the
gray market importing of goods outside of the distribution
channel that the copyright holders had envisioned and
negotiated. Wiley Asia was unsuccessful in its attempts to
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keep Kirtsaeng and his cohorts from acquiring the less
expensive foreign copies of its textbooks, shipping them to the
United States, and placing them in direct competition with the
more expensive editions published by Wiley. Entrepreneurs
such as Kirtsaeng and big box stores like Costco were certainly
the “winners” under the current ruling.125 But, the Court was
also concerned about the other group of winners who would
continue to profit from the Congress’ promotion of the
progress of science and the useful arts after the Court’s current
ruling. Those winners included libraries and their patrons,
used-book dealers and their customers, technology companies
and the consumers of their cars, microwaves, mobile phones,
and personal computers, art museums and their visitors, as well
as retail stores and their purchasers of foreign goods.
Unfortunately, the losers in this case were not limited to the
copyright holders--but also to consumers in developing
markets who may no longer be offered lower prices for goods
that sell for much more in the United States.
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